¿Qué pasaría si, en el momento fundacional de la modernidad, el personaje principal no fuera el yo cartesiano, sino ese otro personaje que Descartes llamó genio maligno? Esa es la hipótesis que plantea el presente ensayo: ¿qué ocurriría si en lugar de la agotada certeza del yo, el mundo moderno se hubiera asentado más bien sobre la confusión y sobre la trampa que se condensan en la metáfora del genio maligno? Desde esa hipótesis, la mayor parte de las configuraciones filosóficas (...) de eso que llamamos modernidad aparecen transfiguradas, se convierten en meras repeticiones de aquel fraude básico que ocultan. Pero donde tales configuraciones velan ese gesto al repetirlo, el género de terror y los discursos sobre la angustia y la locura parecen haberlo denunciado como grietas de un edificio sin fondo. Este es el viaje apasionante que se propone en este libro, un viaje en el que autores como Poe, Stevenson o Conrad se atreven a proponernos lecturas de Nietzsche, Heidegger o Deleuze y Foucault, en el que personajes como Frankenstein o el doctor Jekyll nos enseñan aspectos inéditos de la filosofía de los siglos modernos, un viaje en el que la posmodernidad se revela como el penúltimo recurso retórico de un personaje ficticio y casi olvidado. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

Mary Shelley’sFrankensteinhas captured the public imagination ever since it was first published over 200 years ago. While the narrative reflected 19th-century anxieties about the emerging scientific revolution, it also suggested some clear moral lessons that remain relevant today. In a sense,Frankensteinwas a work of bioethics written a century and a half before the discipline came to exist. This paper revisits the lessons ofFrankensteinregarding the creation and manipulation of life in the light of recent developments in stem cell and neurobiological research. (...) It argues that these lessons are becoming more relevant than ever. (shrink)

On views of five Buddhist Nyāya philosophers on Buddhist logic; includes brief biographical sketches and a list of their works.

Works of Tran Duc Thao, a Vietnamese philosopher.

This commentary suggests that the ongoing malaise of biomedical research results from adopting a doctrine that is incompatible with the principles of creative scientific discovery and thus should be treated as a mental rather than somatic disorder. I overview the progression of the malaise, outline the doctrine and the history of its marriage to science, formulate the diagnosis, justify it by reviewing the symptoms of the malaise, and suggest how to begin to cure the disease.

Commentary on the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa, compendium of the Sāṅkhya school in Hindu philosophy.

One of the five pillars of the Islam, zakat (alms) was made necessary after the hijra. Although Zakat was one of the most important resources of Islamic state treasury for many years, it was excluded from the state authority in the period of Omar bin Abdul-Aziz. In recent years, it has been seen that some Muslim-majority states have made significant attempts to manage zakat under the control of the state. For example; Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, and Nigeria are very important (...) states in terms of zakat application in İslamic world and Malaysia, a Southeast Asian country, comes first among those. Especially after 1990, Malaysia activated a new zakat management. This study deals with the Malaysian zakat system in the context of the state administration of zakat. The aim of the study is to examine the Malaysian zakat system in a comprehensive way. In the study, the history of zakat system in Malaysia, the current zakat models applied in there and the areas to which zakat is distributed are investigated. As a qualitative research method, document analysis was employed in the study. In this context, many international studies were examined which are directly related to the subject, and twenty-five Malaysian websites belonging to the institutions which collect and distribute the funds were also scanned. It has been found that Malaysian zakat system consists of public model, semi-public model and private model and seen that the states are divided into three regions and different zakat models are applied in each region. (shrink)

In recent decades, issues that reside at the center of philosophical and psychological inquiry have been absorbed into a scientific framework variously identified as "brain science," "cognitive science," and "cognitive neuroscience." Scholars have heralded this development as revolutionary, but a revolution implies an existing method has been overturned in favor of something new. What long-held theories have been abandoned or significantly modified in light of cognitive neuroscience? _Consciousness and Mental Life_ questions our present approach to the study of consciousness and (...) the way modern discoveries either mirror or contradict understandings reached in the centuries leading up to our own. Daniel N. Robinson does not wage an attack on the emerging discipline of cognitive science. Rather, he provides the necessary historical context to properly evaluate the relationship between issues of consciousness and neuroscience and their evolution over time. Robinson begins with Aristotle and the ancient Greeks and continues through to René Descartes, David Hume, William James, Daniel Dennett, John Searle, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Derek Parfit. Approaching the issue from both a philosophical and a psychological perspective, Robinson identifies what makes the study of consciousness so problematic and asks whether cognitive neuroscience can truly reveal the origins of mental events, emotions, and preference, or if these occurrences are better understood by studying the whole person, not just the brain. Well-reasoned and thoroughly argued, _Consciousness and Mental Life_ corrects many claims made about the success of brain science and provides a valuable historical context for the study of human consciousness. (shrink)

Skeptical theists are seeking for some reasonable solutions to the evidential problem of evil. One of the most fundamental responses of skeptical theism is that the concept of “gratuitous evil”, which cannot be a proof of the absence of God. Therefore, it is not the existence of God that skeptical theism suspects. Instead, skeptical theism contemplates whether the evil in the world really has a “gratuitous” basis. This paper focuses on Peter van Inwagen's “no-minimum claim”. No-minimum claim” stands in opposition (...) to the views that assume that God minimizes the evils that exist in the world in order to achieve justice. “No-minimum claim” acknowledges that these evils still have enormous amounts to people. Thus “no-minimum claim” suggests that the evils experienced in the world are incompatible with the “best of all possible worlds” views or the other explanations of classical theodicy. According to the “no minimum claim”, the reason why the amount of evil in the world still seems so high may be God’s deliberate calculations in effecting the distribution of these evils. In order to reach these calculations, it is not necessary for the amount of evil that God allowed to reflect on the world to be perfectly manifested at the minimum level. The purpose of this paper is to consider the skeptical theism approach within the framework of Peter van Inwagen's “no-minimum claim” and to limit his arguments to an alternative approach to skeptic theism. Our claim is that such view coincides with skeptical theism, but the “no- minimum claim” still has some ambiguities at the point of the limits of evil. From this, we can conclude that the “no minimum claim” has received many objections in the skeptical theism literature and these objections are justified at certain points. (shrink)

In his award-winning book _The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development_, J. N. Mohanty charted Husserl's philosophical development from the young man's earliest studies—informed by his work as a mathematician—to the publication of his _Ideas_ in 1913. In this welcome new volume, the author takes up the final decades of Husserl's life, addressing the work of his Freiburg period, from 1916 until his death in 1938. As in his earlier work, Mohanty here offers close readings of Husserl's main texts (...) accompanied by accurate summaries, informative commentaries, and original analyses. This book, along with its companion volume, completes the most up-to-date, well-informed, and comprehensive account ever written on Husserl's phenomenological philosophy and its development. (shrink)

This article explores Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as an “object of care” for use in examining the relationship between creativity and responsibility in the sciences and beyond. Through three short sketches from different disciplinary lenses—literature, science and technology studies, and feminist studies—readers get a sense of the different ways scholars might consider Shelley’s text as an object of care. Through an analysis and synthesis of these three sketches, the authors illustrate the value of such an object in thinking about broad (...) cultural issues. The article acts as a kind of boundary object by creating distinct, yet overlapping narratives from an object that is owned by many social worlds. The three sketches reveal Frankenstein as a thoughtful consideration about what it means to care for, or fail to care for, one’s creation, rather than as a cautionary tale about the evils of scientific hubris. Although infrastructures at universities often prevent interdisciplinary dialogue, the article concludes that purposeful boundary objects created around objects of care like Frankenstein can help build bridges and create shared meanings for new interdisciplinary spaces. (shrink)

Some people have supposed that utility is good in itself, non-in-strumentally good, as distinct from good because conducive to other good things. And in modern versions of this view, utility often means want-satisfaction, as distinct from pleasure or happiness. For your want that p to be satisfied, is it necessary that you know or believe that p, or sufficient merely that p is true? However that question is answered, there are problems with the view that want-satisfaction is a non-instrumental good. (...) What if you want something only because you have a false belief? What if the time at which you want that p is fifty or five hundred years before the time to which p itself refers? To meet these difficulties, qualifications have to be introduced, and much has been written about how exactly these qualifications are to be framed.1 There is however what may be a rather more serious objection to the view that want-satisfaction is a non-instrumental good, or rather to the combination of that view with the principle that it is sufficient for your want that p to be satisfied simply that p is true. The objection is that this combination forces you to give undue weight to the mere acquisition of desires when you come to make judgements about changes in the value of things. It forces you to say that for any true proposition p, which initially you do not want to be true, your mere acquisition of a desire that p will, other things being equal, make the world better. Non-instrumental value can be increased merely by multiplying desires, even though everything else remains the same. Surely, however, improving the world is not as easy as that. (shrink)

Paulo Freire consistently upheld humanization and mutuality as educational ideals. This article argues that conceptualizations of knowledge and how knowledge is sought and produced play a role in fostering humanization and mutuality in educational contexts. Drawing on Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein, this article focuses on the two central characters who ‘ardently’ pursue knowledge at all costs. It will be argued that the text suggests two possible outcomes from the pursuit of knowledge. One is mutuality; the other is social disconnectedness.

La creación burlada trata de la más terrible de las sospechas: que toda nuestra vida se halle edificada sobre un inmenso fraude. Esta cuarta parte de la importante Seudología general que Miguel Catalán viene preparando durante los últimos años estudia la ilusión del cosmos y el fraude de la vida, dos nociones que han expresado desde antiguo el miedo de los hombres a verse engañados por fuerzas sobrenaturales. La experiencia, tan penosa como universal, del niño que descubre por vez primera (...) la mentira de los adultos, así como el temor a la falsedad del mundo y el fraude de la vida aparecen en los grandes textos originarios, desde los Vedas y Homero hasta el Barroco y los relatos actuales, Matrix o El show de Truman. El libro recoge, pues, las distintas formas culturales en que se ha manifestado la conciencia de que los dioses y otros poderes numinosos, incluyendo la naturaleza deificada, han engañado a los hombres en virtud del inmenso poder y conocimiento de que disponen en comparación con la debilidad y la ignorancia propiamente humanas. A partir de esa conciencia de inferioridad de los hombres se despliegan los tópicos de la vida como engaño de la naturaleza, como juego de los dioses ociosos, como teatro del mundo, como sueño en la mente de Dios, o carrera en el laberinto o ejercicio de poder demiúrgico. Miguel Catalán González (Valencia, 1958), Doctor en Filosofía con una tesis sobre el pragmatismo clásico y profesor de Ética y Deontología en la Universidad UCH-CEU de Valencia, es autor de una veintena de libros, entre los que destacan sus obras filosóficas Pensamiento y acción o Proceso a la guerra, la colección de aforismos El sol de medianoche (Edicions de Ponent, 2001) y el prólogo a su propio Diccionario de falsas creencias (Ronsel, 2002), que manifiesta por vez primera el interés del autor por las relaciones entre error y falsedad. Con El prestigio de la lejanía. Ilusión, autoengaño y utopía (Ronsel, 2004), Premio de Ensayo Juan Gil-Albert en 1998 y a su vez de la Crítica Valenciana en 2005, Catalán dio inicio a su investigación sobre el engaño. A este siguió Antropología de la mentira (Muchnik, 2005), que fue premio de ensayo Alfons el Magnànim, y en tercer lugar, Anatomía del secreto (Muchnik, 2008). Ha sido editor y traductor, entre otros, de Karl Krause, Marcel Proust y Ambrose Bierce. En 2005 obtuvo el Premio Nacional de Investigación “Ángel Herrera” por su labor en el ámbito de las ciencias sociales. (shrink)

Ni ángel ni bestia, según la conocida sentencia de Blaise Pascal, el ser humano no posee una naturaleza predada y conclusa, sino una condición histórica y contingente, polifacética y ambigua. Por más que se sueñe omnipotente e infinito, está condenado a existir en la escasez, la incertidumbre y la imperfección, y su vida es un drama abierto e impredecible, que sólo la antorcha de un pensamiento a la vez lúcido y cordial –lógico y mítico, racional y sentiente, efectivo y afectivo– (...) es capaz de iluminar. Para lograrlo no dispone, sin embargo, de verdades definitivas, sino sólo de preguntas que dan lugar a respuestas siempre provisionales, engendradoras de interrogantes nuevos. Como en Sócrates según Platón y en Goethe visto por Eckermann, el diálogo no es, entonces, un modo menor del conocimiento humano, sino un camino mayor en pos del siempre frágil y relativo saber posible: una mayéutica que alumbra dudas y sugestiones, reservas y sospechas, y con ellas los acuerdos –y los acordes–llamados a guiar los trayectos personales y colectivos. (shrink)

[I.] Igazság, evidencia és tapasztalat Edmund Husserl munkásságában -- II. Az igazság problémája az időtudat és a keletkezés husserli filozófiájában.

Öz Çalışmanın konusu irfanî geleneğin on beşinci yüzyıldaki önemli temsilcilerinden ve aynı zamanda İbnü’l-Arabî’nin takipçilerinden biri olan İbn Türke’nin varlık mertebelerine dair görüşleridir. Konu, İbn Türke’nin varlık ve varlığın mertebeleri ile ilgili düşüncelerinden hareketle hazırlanmıştır. Birincil kaynakların esas alındığı bu çalışmada, İbn Türke ve Ekberî geleneğin önemli temsilcilerinin eserlerine müracaat edilmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı, felsefe ve kelâmın yanı sıra tasavvuf felsefesinin en önemli konularından biri olan varlık düşüncesi ve varlık mertebelerini İbn Türke’nin görüşleri çerçevesinde ele alarak âlemdeki varoluşun hakikatinin ne olduğu, (...) insanoğlunun özünün nereden geldiği gibi temel sorulara cevap olabilecek özgün bir çalışma ortaya koymaktır. Bu çalışmayla; varlığın bir ve tek hakikat olduğu, Hak’tan feyz ederek görünür âlemde ortaya çıkan her şeyin O’nun isim ve sıfatlarının tecellisi olduğu, her ne kadar Hak’tan ayrıymış gibi görünse de aslında Hakk’a doğru sonsuz bir dönüş içerisinde olduğu, dolayısıyla tek varlıktan kaynaklı çok sayıda varlığın esasen yokluğa mahkûm olduğu ve asıl varlığın Allah olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada 6-11 yaşları arasında Nottingham/İngiltere’de yaşayan çocuklarının çizimlerinde İslam ve Türkiye algısı üzerinden din ve vatan kavram algıları incelenmiştir. Çalışmada sanat temelli araştırma yöntemi ve göstergebilimsel yöntemden faydalanılmıştır. Yapılan çizimlerde çocukların İslam ve Türkiye olgularını hangi değer, sembol ve kavramlarla ilişkilendirdiği ve bu ilişkilendirmede haftasonu Türk okulunda sunulan Türkçe ve Türk Kültürü (TTK) ders kitaplarının etkisi analiz edilmiştir. 14 kız ve 16 erkek öğrenci bu çalışmaya katılmıştır. Çizimlerin ilki 2017 yılında araştırmacının doktora çalışması kapsamında ikincisi 2021 yılında elde edilmiştir. (...) 2017 yılında 8, 2021 yılında 18 çocuğun resmi çalışmada değerlendirilmiştir. Araştırma sonucunda yaşla birlikte simge, sembollerin sayısı ve çizimlerdeki netliğin arttığı gözlenmiştir. Bununla birlikte yıl, yaş ve cinsiyete dayalı olarak çizimlere yansıyan simge, sembol ve yoğunluklarda farklılaşma söz konusudur. Ancak Türkiye ile bayrak, İslam ile cami en çok bağdaştırılan öğeler olarak dikkat çekmiştir. Bu öğelere yapılan vurguda ders kitaplarında kullanılan resimler ve gömülü videolar rol oynamış olabilir. Resimlere yansıyan temaların, TTK program ve kitaplarındaki konularla paralellik gösterdiği saptanmıştır. Özellikle Geçmişe açılan kapı, Gezelim görelim ile Bayramlar ve kutlamalar temalarındaki içeriklerde de görülen kültürel ve dini kimliğe dair öğelerle olan bağının güçlenmesine katkı sağlamaktadır. Türkiye ve İslam’a dair olumlu duygulara karşın, savaş teması kaynaklı korku ve ayrılık gibi negatif duygular erkek çocuklarının çizimlerine yansımıştır. Bu durum 6-11 yaş grubu erkek çocuklarının gelişim özelliğinin getirisi olabileceği gibi, resimlerin yapıldığı zamanda maruz kalınılan uyarıcılar ve tarihe odaklanan Geçmişe açılan kapı gibi temalar çocuklarının algısını şekillendirmiş olabilir. (shrink)

tập 1. Tư tưởng Việt Nam từ đầu Công nguyên đến cuối thời Lý.

1. P'it'agorasŭ Hakp'a ŭi ŭmangnon kwa ujuron -- 2. Arisŭt'ok'ŭsenusŭ ŭi kyŏnghŏm kwahakchŏk ŭmak iron -- 3. P'ŭllat'on-P'it'agorasŭjŏk chŏnt'ong -- 4. Kŭndae roŭi ihaeng -- 5. K'ep'ŭllŏ ŭi ŭmakchŏk ujuron -- 6. Sirhŏm kwahak kwa ŭmak ŭi hamnihwa -- 7. Nyut'ŏn ŭi ŭmakchŏk yubi -- Maejŭmmal : Nyut'ŏn ihu.

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1962, given by Arthur N. Prior (1914-1969).

To show how the case of Mary Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein brings light to the ethical and moral issues raised in Institutional Review Board protocols, we nest an imaginary IRB proposal dated August 1790 by Victor Frankenstein within a discussion of the importance and function of the IRB. Considering the world of science as would have appeared in 1790 when Victor was a student at Ingolstadt, we offer a schematic overview of a fecund moment when advances in comparative anatomy, (...) medical experimentation and theories of life involving animalcules and animal electricity sparked intensive debates about the basic principles of life and the relationship between body and soul. Constructing an IRB application based upon myriad speculations circulating up to 1790, we imagine how Victor would have drawn upon his contemporaries’ scientific work to justify the feasibility of his project, as well as how he might have outlined the ethical implications of his plan to animate life from “dead” tissues. In Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, Victor failed to consider his creature’s autonomy, vulnerability, and welfare. In this IRB proposal, we show Victor facing those issues of justice and emphasize how the novel can be an important component in courses or workshops on research ethics. Had Victor Frankenstein had to submit an IRB proposal tragedy may have been averted, for he would have been compelled to consider the consequences of his experiment and acknowledge, if not fulfill, his concomitant responsibilities to the creature that he abandoned and left to fend for itself. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Socrates Plays the Buffoon:Cautionary Protreptic in EuthydemusAnn N. MicheliniPlato's Euthydemus is somewhat uninteresting to traditional philosophers, who tend to treat the dialogues from the aspect of their theoretical content.1 The arguments repeatedly presented by Socrates' opponents are below Platonic standards,2 while Socrates carries on only a single, somewhat truncated logos of his own. The dialogue's primary interest lies elsewhere, in the odd use it makes of protreptic or conversionary (...) philosophical rhetoric and in its highly ambivalent examination of Socratic tactics. Socrates' adversaries are a pair of ludicrous charlatans, caricatures of the other fifth-century "Sophists"3 whom Plato satirized; but the tactics of the two brothers, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are also awkwardly close to those of Socrates himself. No other Platonic dialogue features interlocutors who make a habit of practicing the Socratic question-and-answer mode, and in no other dialogue does Socrates allow anyone but himself to assume the dominant role of interrogator. 4 The "sandwich" format, in which two Socratic discussions [End Page 509] are flanked by three series of arguments by the brothers, both contrasts Socrates and his opponents and points up their similarity.The encounter is marked by its concern for protreptic, the exhortation, pervasive in later philosophical writing, as it is in the fourth-century texts of Isocrates and Xenophon, to leave conventional ways of life and care for wisdom and moral virtue.5 At the beginning of the discussion (274d7-e5), Socrates asks Dionysodorus whether his wisdom can be transmitted to even one person not yet persuaded of its efficacy. Socrates rather tendentiously concludes from Dionysodorus' positive response that the brothers would therefore be best at exhortation to virtue, and throughout the discussion he persists in pushing them to demonstrate their protreptic.6 This desire in turn motivates his self-abasing relation to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, whom Socrates continually begs, on behalf of his young friend Clinias, to reveal their priceless wisdom and save the boy from bad influences. Not only does Socrates set up the brothers as masters of protreptic but he even offers his own version, showing that wisdom is the key to happiness and concluding that it is "necessary to philosophize" (282d1) in order to be happy. The fact that protreptic language is so little in evidence in Plato's other work implies an exceptional status for Euthydemus, the only dialogue that both employs the terminology of protreptic and focuses on the problems of philosophic exhortation and conversion.The phrase "exhort to philosophy and virtue" is conventional: it appears very frequently in both Xenophon and Isocrates.7 But, while Socrates in Apology describes his vocation in terms of an open protreptic of rebuke and exhortation, his use of the elenchus in the dialogues [End Page 510] is more subtle and tactful.8 More important, the trope of exhortation to virtue is notable for its absence from almost all Platonic texts9 except Euthydemus and the eccentric Clitophon.10 The thematic importance of the phrase in Euthydemus is emphasized by repetition and by overlap between the reported dialogue and its setting, in which Socrates exhorts Crito to join him as a student of the brothers' wisdom, and in which Crito expresses his concerns about the education of his son (, 307a2). In his important work on protreptic, Konrad Gaiser attempted to derive later protreptic from speeches by fifth-century "Sophistic" teachers that were designed to win pupils for training in rhetoric and politics. But, while admonitory or moralizing discourses were composed by figures such as Prodicus and Hippias, as they were by others from Hesiod onward, it does not seem likely that the specifically conversionary protreptic that appears in fourth-century writers derives from thinkers who were primarily concerned with demonstrations of skill. The real source for protreptic is likely to have been the Socratics themselves, writers who used the unconventional Socratic persona both to rebuke immorality and to show the inadequacy of traditional moral concepts. This Socratic protreptic demanded nothing less than a change of life.11Whether the dialogue Clitophon is by Plato or not, it affords a valuable proof that protreptic was associated with Socratic technique: Clitophon, an associate of Thrasymachus in Republic... (shrink)

In this age of DNA computers and artificial intelligence, information is becoming disembodied even as the "bodies" that once carried it vanish into virtuality. While some marvel at these changes, envisioning consciousness downloaded into a computer or humans "beamed" _Star Trek_-style, others view them with horror, seeing monsters brooding in the machines. In _How We Became Posthuman,_ N. Katherine Hayles separates hype from fact, investigating the fate of embodiment in an information age. Hayles relates three interwoven stories: how information lost (...) its body, that is, how it came to be conceptualized as an entity separate from the material forms that carry it; the cultural and technological construction of the cyborg; and the dismantling of the liberal humanist "subject" in cybernetic discourse, along with the emergence of the "posthuman." Ranging widely across the history of technology, cultural studies, and literary criticism, Hayles shows what had to be erased, forgotten, and elided to conceive of information as a disembodied entity. Thus she moves from the post-World War II Macy Conferences on cybernetics to the 1952 novel _Limbo_ by cybernetics aficionado Bernard Wolfe; from the concept of self-making to Philip K. Dick's literary explorations of hallucination and reality; and from artificial life to postmodern novels exploring the implications of seeing humans as cybernetic systems. Although becoming posthuman can be nightmarish, Hayles shows how it can also be liberating. From the birth of cybernetics to artificial life, _How We Became Posthuman_ provides an indispensable account of how we arrived in our virtual age, and of where we might go from here. (shrink)